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Case No. 950663-CA 
BRIDGET L. BOLLAND, 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.
 : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1995). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE # 1 
Whether the defendant's claim of an affirmative defense under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6~402(3)(b) is waived and not permitted on appeal since it was not properly raised at 
the trial court level? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE # 1 
The question of whether an issue may be properly raised on appeal is a question 
of law and will be reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993). 
ISSUE # 2 
Whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated her probation by 
committing theft and attempted theft by deception? 
l 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE # 2 
The issue of whether there were sufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
evidentiary findings is a question of fact which "shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030,1031 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3) (Supp. 1995). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1995). 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (Supp. 1995). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Order to Show Cause hearing was held on September 26, 1995 to determine 
whether the defendant had violated the terms of her probationary sentence by commit-
ting theft and attempted theft by deception. The defendant had been placed on proba-
tion as a result of a plea in abeyance entered on 23 class A misdemeanor counts of 
fraudulently obtaining unemployment compensation in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
35-4-19 (Supp. 1995). The defendant has now appealed the trial court's finding that 
she violated her probation and the court's entry of a guilty plea on each of the 23 mis-
demeanor counts. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACT 
The defendant volunteered at the Aspen Animal Medical Clinic (Clinic) which 
was owned and operated Dr. Reed A. Jones and did work there with the Utah Ferret 
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Rescue and Shelter (R. at 64). In the course of his practice, Dr. Jones rehabilitated 
injured ferrets and gave the defendant the responsibility of arranging for the placement 
of the ferrets once he had authorized their adoption (R. at 73). Dr. Jones trusted the 
defendant and relied on her to collect a $100.00 placement fee from individuals who 
adopted ferrets from the Ferret Rescue Shelter (R. at 28). The defendant testified that 
she had placed approximately fifteen ferrets and had collected adoption fees for ten or 
eleven of them (R. at 158). Pursuant to an agreement between Dr. Jones and the Utah 
Ferret Association (Association), half of the money collected from the placements was 
to go to Dr. Jones to cover the cost of caring for the animals and the other half was to 
go the Association to provide money for a newsletter (R. at 74 & 118). The undisputed 
testimony presented at the hearing by Dr. Jones and Carma Evans, the editor of the 
Association's newsletter, established that neither Dr. Jones, nor the Utah Ferret Asso-
ciation ever received any of the money that was collected from the adoption of the fer-
rets (R. at 76 &118). Instead, the defendant testified that she had used the money to 
purchase food and supplies and medical treatment for the ferrets (R. at 158). 
Dr. Jones requested an accounting of the money that the defendant had 
collected in the course of her ferret placement activities (R. at 65). The defendant re-
fused to give Dr. Jones such an accounting and Dr. Jones wrote the defendant a letter 
in which he expressed his willingness to discuss the issue with her if she would only 
present him with an accounting of what money was collected and how it was spent. 
(Id.). On April 25, 1995, the defendant went to the Clinic, demanding to speak with Dr. 
Jones and disrupting the Clinic's regular business (R. at 65). Garry McAllister, Dr. 
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Jones1 attorney spoke with the defendant and arranged an appointment for the next day 
(R. at 57). At Mr. McAllister's office on the 26th, the defendant was personally given a 
copy of a letter which notified her that she was no longer welcome at the Clinic and that 
she was not to hold herself out as a representative of the Clinic (R. at 61). 
Soon thereafter, Dr. Jones notified Edwards Pet Supplies Company (Edwards) 
that the defendant was no longer authorized to purchase merchandise on the Clinic's 
account (R. at 79). The defendant had originally set up the Clinic's account at Edwards 
and had sometimes purchased things there for her personal use by writing a check for 
merchandise (R. at 90-91). After having been notified that she was not to hold herself 
out as a representative of the Clinic, the defendant placed an order at Edwards in an 
amount close to $1000.00 on the Clinic's account (R. at 123). Lynn Edwards, the Office 
Manager of Edwards testified that this was an unusually large order in that orders for 
the Clinic usually ranged from $150.00 to $200.00 at the maximum (R. at 124). When 
the defendant came in to pick up the order, Ms. Edwards told the defendant that she 
was no longer authorized to purchase on the Clinic's account, but that she could pur-
chase the merchandise if she were to set up another account in her own name (R. at 
124). The defendant said that she might be able to get a purchase order from the 
University of Utah, and that she would have her secretary call with the information (R. at 
125). The defendant never attempted to pay for the items and left the store without the 
merchandise (R. at 126). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant committed theft in violation of her probation by collecting place-
ment fees for adopted ferrets and keeping the money instead of giving the money to Dr. 
Jones and the Association. The defendant also violated her probation by committing 
attempted theft by deception when she placed a large order from Edwards on the 
Clinic's account and then went to Edwards to pick up the merchandise. The defendant 
may not rely on the affirmative defense that she had an honest belief that she was 
entitled to use the money to buy supplies or entitled to charge on the Clinic's account 
because it was not raised at the trial court level and was therefore waived. The clear 
weight of the evidence supports the trial court's findings that the defendant violated her 
probation by a preponderance of the evidence and the trial court's finding was not 
clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE HONEST BELIEF EXCEPTION TO THE THEFT STATUTE 
IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE THAT CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
The defendant has argued that the trial court erred in finding that she violated 
her probation because she had an honest belief that she was entitled to the property 
which is an affirmative defense to the offenses of theft and attempted theft by decep-
tion. It is a defense to the charge of theft if the person "acted in the honest belief that 
he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or service as he did." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (Supp. 1995). However, the defendant may not properly 
claim this defense on appeal because it was never considered at the hearing and all 
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affirmative defenses must be raised at the trial court or are considered to be waived. 
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah 1983). 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party "waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not present either by motion . . . or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply." Rule 12(h), Utah R.Civ.P. This rule is made 
applicable to this case by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which pro-
vides that when an appeal is taken by a defendant from an order made after judgment, 
"[t]he rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals to the appel-
late court." Rule 26(7), Utah R.Crim.P. Thus, by way of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant is 
deemed to have waived all affirmative defenses that were not previously raised at the 
trial. In Phillips, the Court relied on Rule 12(h) in their refusal to consider an affirmative 
defense that was raised for the first time on appeal stating that "[t]his Court will not 
consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial court and concerning 
which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact or law." 
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 884 (Utah 1983) (citing Turtle 
Management, Inc. V. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)). 
In this case, the defendant never raised the honest belief defense in any plead-
ings or at trial. Counsel for the defendant did not address this issue in her closing 
argument, nor did the prosecution. The mere fact that evidence may have been intro-
duced at trial which may support an honest belief defense, is not sufficient to properly 
bring the issue before this court. An affirmative defense "raises matters outside the 
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plaintiffs' prima facie case, and the failure to assert it is a waiver of that defense." 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const Co., 682 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1984). In Mabey the 
defense failed to raise an affirmative defense in its pleadings, and the Court refused to 
find that the issue had been tried by implied or express consent because the issue was 
not relied on in closing arguments, nor was a motion ever made to amend the plead-
ings. Therefore, where an affirmative defense is not properly raised by motion or 
argued at the trial, the affirmative defense is deemed to be waived and may not be 
argued on appeal. The defendant should be prohibited from arguing the honest belief 
defense at this stage because it was never raised below and the trial court did not have 
an opportunity to consider the issue. 
II. THE RECORD CONTAINS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
BY A PREPONDERANCE THAT THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED 
HER PROBATION BY COMMITTING THEFT AND ATTEMPTED 
THEFT BY DECEPTION 
The evidence presented at the Order to Show Cause Hearing was sufficient to 
support the Court's finding that the defendant had committed the crimes of theft and 
theft by deception in violation of her probation. Where the appellant has challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence and must show that the findings of fact made by the trial 
court were clearly erroneous, "the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an 
attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-6 (Utah 1990). The level of deference 
is even higher in cases where the judge is the trier of fact as the Utah Supreme Court 
has said, 
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[w]hen reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is "against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988)(citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987); Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a)). Upon review of the record to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the Court has said that "we accord deference to the trial 
court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor." Id. at 787. 
The evidence presented at the Order to Show Cause Hearing supports the trial 
court's determination that the defendant had committed theft and attempted theft by 
deception. With regard to the theft charge, the defendant admitted to placing at least 
fifteen ferrets and collecting adoption fees for ten to eleven of those placements (R. at 
158). The undisputed testimony of both Dr. Jones and Carma Evans shows that 
neither one of them ever received any of the fees despite the agreement between them 
which required that each party would receive half of the money collected (R. at 76, 
118). The defendant was made aware of the agreement between the Association and 
Dr. Jones and was requested to give an accounting of the money that she received, 
which she never did (R. at 65). Dr. Jones gave the defendant the opportunity to clear 
the matter up if the defendant would only explain where the money had gone, but the 
defendant refused (R. at 65). The defendant testified at the hearing that she had used 
the money to buy pet food and supplies and to pay for medical care for the ferrets (R. at 
176). However, Dr. Jones testified that he provided all of the medical care to the ferrets 
at no charge in the Clinic (R. at 73). Furthermore, contrary to defendant's initial testi-
mony that she used the proceeds to buy supplies, she later testified that she received 
8 
the supplies for free (R. at 18). No affirmative defense was ever argued at the trial 
court below, and as established above, this issue should not be considered by the 
Court. In light of these facts, it was proper for the trial court to find that the defendant 
had committed theft in violation of her probation. 
There was also sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that that the defen-
dant had committed attempted theft by deception. The defendant placed a substantial 
order at Edwards (R. at 124) after she was notified that she was not to hold herself out 
as a representative of the Clinic (R. at 61,171). (See Addendum A) Dr. Jones had 
taken her name off the Clinic's account at Edwards and the defendant was no longer 
authorized to charge on that account (R. at 122). The defendant took a substantial step 
towards obtaining merchandise on the Clinic's account when she went to Edwards and 
attempted to pick up the large order of merchandise (R. at 78). Although the defendant 
testified that she would have paid for the merchandise there is no evidence to support 
this assertion since she did not make any attempt to write out a check as she had done 
on other occasions (R. at 125,173). Once the defendant was told that she could not 
charge on the Clinic's account, she stated that she would arrange for payment through 
a purchase order from the University of Utah, but never made such arrangements or 
ever came back for the merchandise (R. at 185). 
"Where the evidence is in conflict, an appellate court must defer to the trial 
court's first-hand assessment of the witnesses' credibility, and assume that the trial 
court believed those aspects of the evidence which support its findings." Hal Taylor 
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). In this case, 
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there was some conflicting evidence presented, however the trial court did not find the 
defendant's statements credible. Therefore, the State presented a preponderance of 
evidence to establish that the defendant committed theft and attempted theft by decep-
tion. The trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous, nor against the clear weight 
of the evidence and the appellate court should not disturb the trial court's decision that 
the defendant had violated her probation. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant may not raise an affirmative defense for the first time on appeal 
and it would not be proper for the Court to consider the defendant's claim that she 
acted with an honest belief. The evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient to show 
by a preponderance that the defendant unlawfully retained the adoption fees that she 
collected and that she attempted to obtain merchandise from Edwards on the Clinic's 
account. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant had violated 
her probation by committing theft and attempted theft by deception and the decision by 
the trial court should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z~ day of April, 1996. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for^SalLLake County 
WIURA 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Blake A. Nakamura, hereby certify that eight (8) copies of the above BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE, will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, #300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah; and further, that four (4) copies of the same will be delivered to 
JEROME H. MOONEY & MICHAEL I. CHIDESTER, Attorneys for Appellant, 50 West 





April 26, 1995 
HAND DELIVERED 
Ms. Bridgett Bolland 
P.O. 1145 
Draper, Utah 84020 
re: Aspen Animal Medical Clinic 
Dear Ms. Bolland: 
I am counsel for Dr. Reed Jones, D.M.V.
 f of the Aspen 
Animal Medical Clinic. This letter is to inform you that you no 
longer have free access to that Clinic and that you must refrain 
from contacting Dr. Jones, the personnel of the Clinic or its 
clientele. You are also hereby placed on notice that you may not 
hold yourself out as the representative of the Clinic or Dr. 
Jones. Any and all communications regarding any matter contained 
herein shall, henceforth, be directed, in writing, to this 
office. 
In addition, it is my understanding that Dr. Jones 
provided you with a brief summary of the services and expenses 
incurred by the Clinic on your behalf and on the behalf of Ferret 
Rescue & Shelter. He has previously requested that you provide a 
complete accounting with regard to the Ferrets that you have sold 
and the proceeds received. At present, it appears that you have 
an outstanding balance owing the Clinic in excess of $275.00. 
Please remit the same by or before the end of this month. 
The aquarium which you donated for sale to benefit Utah 
Ferret Rescue & Shelter, will be sold for that purpose as your 
advertisement requested and the proceeds used by Dr. Jones for 
his continuing efforts in caring for and placement of ferrets for 
adoption. 
GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY. 
Sincerely, 
J. Garry McAllister 
JGM/jr 
c c : Dr. R. J o n e s , D.M.V, 
